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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
f I were required, in the manner of Hillel, to very 
briefly summarize Piketty’s book, I would offer the 
following: Given plausible economic forecasts regarding 
global world output in the twenty-first century, unless 
sufficiently robust political measures are taken (say, a 
global tax on capital), the contingent (but historically 
prevalent) fact that the rate of return on capital is greater 
than the rate of growth will probably allow past capital 
allocations to devour larger proportions of capital 
reducing the capital available for those without large 
fortunes potentially to levels similar to the distributions 
prior to the two world wars—and this is bad. 
 
I 
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What did capital allocations look like around 1910? In 
Europe the top 10 percent owned about 90 percent of 
capital—the top 1 percent owned 50 percent, and the 
middle 40 percent (between the top 10 percent and the 
bottom 50 percent) owned about 5 percent, as did the 
bottom 50 percent. As we will see, the two world wars and 
the Great Depression destroyed large fortunes, and policies 
were put in place during the wars and their aftermath 
leading to the creation of a property-owning middle class 
(the 40 percent between the top 10 percent and bottom 50 
percent (Table 7.2)) owning significantly more capital than 
at any time in the past, around a third of the capital stock 
rather than 5 percent. Piketty refers to this middle class as 
the patrimonial middle class, for it is not uncommon for 
members of the new middle class to possess enough capital 
to hand down some of it at death. Many of us take it for 
granted that a patrimonial middle class will persist in the 
wealthy countries. Piketty is not so optimistic. 
 
Do not allow my inelegant summary to lead you to believe 
that Pikkety’s book is dense and riddled with equations. 
The fact that a book of well over 600 pages can be 
summarized in one sentence is evidence that this tome is 
elegant—inasmuch as a tome can be elegant. And Piketty 
has the admirable quality of intellectual modesty; indeed, 
part of what he is attempting to do is to find a way to 
procure better data so that one need not include Forbes 
magazine and university endowments (for which we have 
public data) to argue for the conclusion that capital in the 
hands of the extremely wealthy may grow faster than the 
capital in the hands of less wealthy individuals due in part 
to financial mediation (e.g., money managers). 
 
I hope to summarize Piketty’s reasoning more thoroughly 
in what follows. The final section will focus on what his 
data and arguments mean for those of us who are interested 
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in political philosophy, in particular regarding notions of 
distributive justice. In the remainder of this section, I will 
briefly set the stage for the remaining sections. 
 
First, given the paucity of information prior to (and to some 
extent including) the twentieth century and early twenty-
first century, Piketty relies on information provided mainly 
by the United States, Japan, Germany, France, and Great 
Britain. These are the leading developed countries, and they 
are the countries with some level of transparency and 
lengthy tax records, and so on. 
 
Second, while some economists make a distinction between 
capital and wealth, Piketty uses the terms interchangeably. 
By capital he means “the sum total of nonhuman assets that 
can be owned and exchanged on some market” (46). He 
does not include human capital in his definition. 
 
Third, Piketty agrees with economic projections concluding 
that world output or growth will be reduced in the twenty-
first century; the rapid growth after the world wars was a 
function mainly of post-war rebuilding and the growth that 
is a function of some countries (e.g., China) catching up to 
the countries (e.g., the US, France, et cetera) at the 
technological frontier. Once all countries catch up, then 
growth will no longer reach levels over about 1.5 percent, 
according to Piketty (375). Since it is the proportional 
difference between savings and the growth rate that 
determines (over time) the ratio between capital and 
income, we may be on the way to a capital-income ratio 
associated with an inheritance society in which capital is 
concentrated and the very wealthy can acquire a larger 
proportion of the remaining and (slowly) growing stock of 
capital by reinvesting a portion of their annual return from 
capital investments. And there is only so much capital to go 
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around. The pie does grow, but slowly. The slices going to 
the very wealthy, however, grow disproportionately. 
 
Consider a marble-loving club. At t1 the distribution is as 
follows: the top 10 percent own 70 percent of the marbles, 
and the other 90 percent own 30 percent of the marbles. At 
t1 there are 1,000 marbles total, so the top 10 percent own 
700 marbles and the other 90 percent own 300 marbles. 
Now let’s say that the group was able to increase its total 
amount of marbles by 2 percent at t2. At t2 there are thus 
1,020 marbles. Let’s further assume that the top 10 percent 
increased its marble collection by 6 percent at t2. In this 
case, the top 10 percent own over 72 percent of the marbles 
held by the whole group, 742 of the 1,020 marbles, while 
the other 90 percent own slightly more than 27 percent, 278 
of the 1,020 marbles. As our example illustrates, it is quite 
possible for the amount of capital to increase overall (the 
pie is getting larger) and for inequalities in ownership 
within the country to become vast over time. It is not 
always the case, and perhaps it is not often the case, that a 
rising tide lifts all boats. 
 
Fourth, Piketty uses one symbolic representation and two 
equations throughout the book. It is unclear to me whether 
a reader of his book must know the two equations to 
understand the book well, for he tends to explain his points 
rather than expect the reader to remember his equations. 
Still, they are helpful and simple. But I will follow 
Piketty’s lead and use his equations merely as a secondary 
and (for some) simplifying addition. With the exception of 
the symbolic representation r > g, you need not know them 
to continue, but here they are. 
 
r > g (This means that the average rate of return on 
capital (e.g., dividends, interest, rent, and so on) is 
larger than the rate of growth in the economy. r > g 
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is a historical regularity rather than a necessary fact. 
This very simple symbolic representation is central 
to Piketty’s arguments.) 
 
α = r × β (α is the share of capital income in 
national income; r is the average rate of return on 
capital; and β is the capital-income ratio—the value 
of the capital stock/the income from all sources 
(i.e., labor income and income from returns on 
capital). So α = r × β “says that the share of capital 
in national income is equal to the product of the 
return on capital and the capital-income ratio…” 
(33).) 
 
β = s/g (This equation obtains only over the long 
run (168). It says that the capital-income ratio is 
equal to savings divided by growth. For example, if 
the US saves 10 percent of its income and the 
growth rate of the economy is 2 percent, then β = 
10/2 or 5/1. Putting the last two equations (α = r × 
β; β = s/g) together and using the numbers I have 
supplied for β, if r is 5 percent, then α = .05 × 5 (or 
25 percent). So the share of capital income (e.g., 
dividends, interest, and so on) in national income 
would be 25 percent, with labor income making up 
the remaining 75 percent.) 
 
Finally, I will not consistently follow Piketty’s sequence as 
I present his arguments. I found it easier in a summary to 
organize topics in a slightly different way. 
 
2. CAPITAL’S COLLISION WITH TWO WORLD 
WARS 
 
As mentioned in section 1, capital was highly concentrated 
at the turn of the twentieth century, with the wealthiest 10 
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percent holding almost all of the capital (about 90 percent) 
and the remaining 90 percent owning the remaining 10 
percent, with the bottom 50 percent of a country’s 
population owning virtually nothing. There are a few 
reasons for this concentration of wealth in the rich 
countries. First, taxation was essentially nonexistent, so 
nominal returns on capital (the returns from dividends, 
rents, interest, and so on) were nearly the same as the real 
return after taxation. Second, the growth rate was very low 
(.01 percent rather than the 3 percent that we have become 
accustomed to seeing (Table 2.1, Figures 2.4 and 2.5)). The 
return on one’s capital need not be too high to continuously 
evolve into larger and larger acquisitions of capital. Third, 
significant and consistent technological improvements 
requiring heightened skills and training were lacking, so it 
was difficult for labor to make economic progress. 
 
The two world wars, however, interrupted this deliberate 
and regular system of wealth concentration. One obvious 
assault on acquired capital was physical destruction of 
assets, public and private. Foreign investments were often a 
wash, and the savings rate was reduced during this period 
as well (148). Those who did save often lent to their 
governments, only to be repaid later with inflated dollars 
(149). And the Great Depression and ensuing bankruptcies 
had an impact on concentrated wealth as well, as did public 
polices (e.g., nationalizations, rent controls, and wage 
controls) (275). As Piketty puts it, “In the twentieth century 
it was war…that erased the past and enabled society to 
begin anew with a clean slate” (275). 
 
Obviously some countries suffered less than others during 
these wars, and it is hardly the case that all large fortunes 
were reduced to such an extent that access to capital 
reached something like a resetting of capital acquisitions 
leading to a fresh and fair competition for new capital 
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acquisitions. Still, it only takes a superficial perusal of 
some of Piketty’s data (see Figures 8.1 and 8.2 for 
example) to get his point and forgive the hyperbole. 
 
3. MAIN FORCES FOR CONVERGENCE 
 
In this section we will consider three important changes 
that occurred in the twentieth century that have narrowed 
the wealth gap, changes that have created a patrimonial 
middle class (the class between the top 10 percent and 
bottom 50 percent) and have made it more difficult for 
fortunes to be amassed quickly: complex production 
technologies requiring skills and training; significant taxes 
on income and capital; and growth rates minimizing the 
difference between r and g. 
 
Over the long run, it is investment in education and skills 
that will allow people to compete for professions that pay 
well (21, 313). And if enough of these jobs are available 
requiring complex skills and education, then it is possible 
to maintain a difference in labor income between the top 10 
percent and the patrimonial middle class that is not too 
wide. Piketty is dubious regarding the prospects of 
technological advances requiring such training and skills 
continuing at as rapid a pace in the twenty-first century as it 
developed in the twentieth century. Still, this is certainly a 
force for convergence, even if its relevance declines 
somewhat in the twenty-first century. 
 
Prior to the wars, a rich country only consumed about 10 
percent of its income in taxes. This, as mentioned earlier, is 
one of the reasons why fortunes could grow quickly and 
robustly prior to the wars. The return on capital was not 
significantly reduced by taxation. To fund the wars, taxes 
were increased in nearly all categories, earned income from 
labor as well as unearned income from capital. The 
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progressive income tax and inheritance tax were put in 
place also due to the emergency situation rather than a 
calculated attempt to foster more just allocations of wealth 
(493). All of the rich countries today consume about a third 
to a half of their national income in taxes, a huge (threefold 
to fivefold) difference from the 10 percent prior to the wars 
(476). The progressive income tax is responsible for 
reducing the gap in income from labor, but capital income 
did not escape unscathed, for “the average tax rate on 
income from capital is currently around 30 percent in most 
of the rich countries. This is the primary reason for the 
large gap between the pure economic return on capital and 
the return actually accruing to individual owners” (208). 
 
It is nearly common knowledge that post-war tax rates in 
the US were higher in the two decades following World 
War II than they are today. The top federal income tax 
bracket was 39.6 percent in 2013—from about $500,000 on 
up, while it was 91 percent on incomes over about 
$1,000,000 in 1963. (Both figures represent 2012 dollars.) 
The top rate has been reduced to under half its high in the 
middle decades of the twentieth century. It is, however, still 
considerably higher than (say) 1931, in which the top rate 
was 25 percent. Is this force for convergence here to stay? 
 
The major twentieth-century innovation in 
taxation was the creation and development of 
the progressive income tax. … It may…be in 
jeopardy because its foundations were never 
clearly thought through, owing to the fact that 
it was instituted in an emergency that left 
little time for reflection. The same is true of 
the progressive tax on inheritances, which 
was the second major fiscal innovation of the 
twentieth century and has also been challeng-
ed in recent decades. (493) 
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Later we will consider Piketty’s argument for strategically 
using taxes on all capital for procuring information useful 
to both institutions like the International Monetary Fund as 
well as informed democratic discussions regarding the 
growth of inequality of capital allocations. The tax(es) 
would have a dual purpose: to inform and to abate runaway 
inequality. 
 
Throughout most of history, the economic growth rate was 
very low compared to the growth rate in the last few 
centuries. Coupled with low taxes and a consistent income 
from capital at about 4 or 5 percent, r > g (where r is (say) 
5 percent and g is (say) .01 to .02 percent) will allow 
accumulated capital to grow and devour further capital, a 
devouring that is not the result of the purchasing power of 
labor income. The income from capital “buys” more 
capital. And there is only so much to go around. Even as 
the capital pie grows, the wealthy are able to take 
proportionally larger slices. While the state of affairs in 
which the difference between r and g is reduced is a force 
for convergence, the victory is, for Piketty, of small 
consequence, for “inequality of wealth would still increase 
substantial (halving the middle-class share of national 
wealth, for example, which voters might well find 
unacceptable)…” (375). The expected reduction in the 
difference between r and g in the world may, from a certain 
perspective, be good news, but it may not, from that same 
perspective (i.e., minimizing inequality of capital 
allocations), be great news. A problematic difference 
remains. 
 
4. FORCES FOR CONVERGENCE AND THE 
PATRIMONIAL MIDDLE CLASS 
 
As we have seen, Piketty commonly refers to the following 
classes: the top 10 percent (he calls it the upper decile), the 
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top 1 percent (he calls it the upper centile), the bottom 50 
percent, and occasionally the top thousandth. He refers to 
the class (40 percent) consisting of members between the 
top 10 percent and the bottom 50 percent as the middle 
class. Prior to the twentieth century—especially in Europe, 
the difference in capital ownership between the middle 
class and bottom 50 percent was fairly small, around 5 
percent or less for the bottom 50 percent and just slightly 
more than that for the middle class. There was little 
suggesting “middle” in this middle class. The members 
were merely slightly less poor. 
 
Let’s again take a look at what the capital distributions 
looked like around 1910. In Europe the top 10 percent 
owned about 90 percent of capital—the top 1 percent 
owned 50 percent, and the middle 40 percent (between the 
top 10 percent and the bottom 50 percent) owned about 5 
percent, as did the bottom 50 percent. In the last section, we 
saw that the two world wars and the Great Depression 
destroyed large fortunes, and policies were put in place 
during the wars and their aftermath (e.g., progressive 
taxation) leading to the creation of a property-owning 
middle class (the 40 percent between the top 10 percent and 
bottom 50 percent (Table 7.2)) owning significantly more 
capital than at any time in the past, around a third of the 
capital stock rather than 5 percent. 
 
Are the distributions so different today? It is a victory of 
sorts for those of us who believe that economic justice 
requires a significantly egalitarian distribution of income 
and wealth, but “all the middle class managed to get its 
hands on was a few crumbs: barely more than a third of 
Europe’s wealth and barely a quarter in the United States” 
(261). Today the upper 10 percent “own 60 percent of 
Europe’s wealth and more than 70 percent in the United 
States” (261), and the 2010 survey from the United States’ 
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Federal Reserve “indicates that the top decile won 72% of 
America’s wealth, while the bottom half claim just 2 
percent” (257). 
 
Piketty’s purpose in his book is largely to provide useful 
information not merely for the sake of providing interesting 
economic trends, but to provide us with the means to 
preserve this more robust middle class. While Piketty 
briefly discusses John Rawls’ (egalitarian) difference 
principle (480), he tends to believe that democratic debate 
with adequate information is the best means for resolving 
matters of distributive justice, since the consensus at the 
theoretical level, where something like Rawls’ difference 
principle would reside, must be filtered through historical 
circumstances and economic possibilities. It is clear, 
however, that Piketty’s leanings are significantly 
egalitarian. (We will discuss Rawls’ difference principle in 
the final section.) 
 
Piketty states that the “emergence of a patrimonial middle 
class was an important, if fragile, historical innovation…” 
(261). Why is it fragile? In section 3 we discussed the role 
of taxes in minimizing the return on capital and labor 
income—specifically the important role that the progress-
ive income tax and the progressive inheritance tax played 
in minimizing the difference between r and g. The real rate 
of return on capital and the ability to save a large portion of 
one’s labor income were both reduced, slowing the process 
of accumulating wealth. An inheritance society requires a 
high capital-income ratio, on the order of about 6 to 1 or 7 
to 1 (410). Recall that it takes a lot of time for β (the 
capital-income ratio) to obtain even when savings in a 
country is high, for β = s/g is true over the long run. When 
s (savings) is frustrated by taxes that reduce the amount of 
a person’s income that can be saved, it may be possible to 
slow or terminate the possibility for β to reach a level that 
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was reached prior to the world wars—the capital-income 
ratio would be too small to allow distributions of wealth 
seen prior to the two wars. So the existence and persistence 
of the patrimonial middle class is indeed fragile, for it is far 
from clear that the trend toward lower taxation in the rich 
countries can be met with sufficient democratic argument 
to return to something like the tax rates witnessed in the 
wake of the world wars. The high tax rates were in large 
part a response to the need to pay for the wars; they were 
not intended to be deliberate moves toward an egalitarian 
distribution of wealth. 
 
5. FORCES FOR DIVERGENCE AND THE 
CONCENTRATION OF CAPITAL 
 
What are the main forces today that are instrumental in 
creating or fostering inequality in the distribution of 
capital? The reduction of taxes, both on earned income 
(i.e., income from labor) and unearned income (e.g., 
dividends) is one of the chief reasons for the growing 
concentration of wealth in the rich countries since the 
1980s. The lower taxes on high incomes and capital gains 
allows for those who have a lot to save a lot, and much of 
what is saved consists in the return on capital rather than 
income from labor, especially in Europe. 
 
Another reason for divergence is the slowing world 
economy. Growth is slowing and according to Piketty will 
continue to slow as countries like China catch up with the 
rich countries on the technological frontier. If we assume 
that the rate of return on capital remains about the same or 
is only reduced somewhat, the decline of growth can have 
enormous consequences for future allocations of capital. 
The smaller g is in relation to r in r > g, the easier it is for r 
to increase fortunes inordinately. This is true because a 
wide capital-income ratio does not necessitate a large 
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number for savings necessarily so long as the growth rate is 
low. For example, if the growth rate is 10 percent and the 
savings rate is a whopping 30 percent, β (the capital-
income ratio) is only 3 to 1, probably far too small for large 
savers to run away with the rapidly growing capital stock in 
spite of the huge amount being saved. However, if the 
growth rate is 1 percent and the rate of savings is 10 
percent (rather than a wild 30 percent!), then β is 10 to 1. If 
the rate of return on capital averages (say) 4 percent, then 
(over time) 40 percent of national income would be income 
from capital (e.g., dividends, interest, and so on). Using the 
equation provided in section 1, α = r × β, if r = 4 percent 
and β = 10 to 1, we obtain a value for α (the share of capital 
income in a country’s total income) of 40 percent. A 
country like this is ripe for an inheritance society and 
distributions of capital inconsistent with maintaining a 
patrimonial middle class. Capital consumes more capital. 
“The past devours the future” (571). 
 
Since, compared to the distribution of capital, labor income 
is not as unequal as one might think (for example, in 
Europe in 2010 the top 10 percent possessed 25 percent of 
the year’s income from labor and the top 1 percent 
possessed 7 percent, while the middle class and bottom 50 
percent possessed 45 percent and 30 percent respectively 
(Table 7.1)), for high concentrations of wealth, it is also 
required that “most of the capital stock must consist of 
inherited capital” (410). Without inherited capital playing 
the larger role in wealth accumulation, we may see the 
volume effect predominate over concentration. There will 
be a lot of petits rentiers, middling fortunes, as the rule. 
There will be a lot of wealthy families rather than a small 
number of extremely wealthy families. Perhaps not such a 
bad thing, given one of the alternatives: enormous (even 
outrageous) concentrations of wealth. 
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The United States and other Anglo-Saxon countries are 
experimenting (if that’s the right word) with their own form 
of inequality: inequality of labor income at the extremes. 
While the United States is well known be below the 
average regarding the minimum wage among the rich 
countries, we certainly do have winners at the other 
extreme. Piketty refers to the US as having a 
hypermeritocratic society rather than (as in Europe before 
the world wars) a hyperpatrimonial society. The US 
rewards competence, work, and risk—or so the story goes. 
Since the 1970s the US has witnessed the birth of what 
Piketty refers to as the “supermanager” (265). Regarding 
this hypermeritocratic society, Piketty says, “this is a very 
inegalitarian society, but one in which the peak of the 
income hierarchy is dominated by very high incomes from 
labor rather than by inherited wealth” (Ibid.). And there is 
nothing to stop the children of these supermanagers from 
becoming rentiers and living off of (and reinvesting large 
portions of) their inherited wealth (Ibid.). 
 
Are such large compensation packages deserved? Piketty 
does not think so. Given that this level of work is difficult 
to replicate (unlike, say, the work of an assembly line 
worker), it is not really possible to even roughly determine 
the marginal product of the highly compensated manager; it 
is not possible to make a strong argument from added 
productivity (330-331). Furthermore, since managers from 
other countries, especially non-Anglo-Saxon countries, are 
equally successful while receiving far less in wages, it is 
difficult to show how the especially high wages of US 
managers can be justified. According to Piketty the only 
“justification” for extraordinary wages at the top of the 
income distribution in the US is a social norm that was 
developed in Anglo-Saxon countries, and in particular the 
United States (332-333). Apparently this “justification” is 
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catching on, for Europe and Japan are moving in this 
direction as well, but not yet to the same extent (Ibid.). 
 
There is yet another force for divergence at the peak of the 
wealth hierarchy: the ability of the extremely wealthy (the 
top thousandth on up) to acquire more capital than the 
merely very wealthy. The extremely wealthy possess 
sufficient resources to hire the very best money managers. 
There is some evidence to believe that there is more than 
just luck as a factor when it comes to beating the market. 
The barely wealthy and even the middling wealthy do not 
have the extra resources to employ the best money 
managers even part time. But the extremely wealthy can 
spend far less than 1 percent of income to employ the best 
financial consultants on a full-time basis. And we do see 
that the extremely wealthy have a larger real growth rate 
than the rest of us (Table 12.1). This portends a frightening 
future state of affairs. 
 
If the top thousandth enjoy a 6 percent [real] 
rate of return on their wealth, while the 
average global wealth grows at only 2 
percent a year, then after thirty years the top 
thousandth’s share of global capital will have 
more than tripled. The top thousandth would 
then own 60 percent of global wealth, which 
is hard to imagine in the framework of 
existing political institutions unless there is a 
particularly effective system of repression or 
an extremely powerful apparatus of per-
suasion, or perhaps both. (439) 
 
In this case, the concentration of capital (in fewer and 
fewer hands) would override the volume effect in which 
capital allocations, while unequal, are spread out more 
evenly throughout the top 10 percent. 
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Imagine having a fortune like one possessed by Bill Gates 
or Liliane Bettencourt, the heiress of L’Oreal. Gates’ 
fortune grew from $4 billion to $50 billion in twenty 
years—from 1990 to 2010 (440). During the same period, 
Bettencourt’s $2 billion grew to $25 billion (Ibid.). “Both 
fortunes thus grew at a rate of more than 13 percent from 
1990 to 2010, equivalent to a real return on capital of 10 to 
11 percent after correcting for inflation” (Ibid.). With 
fortunes this large, the growth of the person’s capital 
income will not be disturbed too much by removing enough 
for a luxurious life—and paying taxes on that amount. The 
remainder can be reinvested so that the person’s capital 
stock grows and acquires the ability to procure larger 
proportions of the capital stock. And, once again, there is 
only so much to go around. 
 
Given the powerful forces for divergence considered in this 
section and the significantly less-powerful forces for 
convergence considered in section 3, Piketty is rightly 
concerned about the future distributions of capital and the 
vitality of the patrimonial middle class. 
 
6. PIKETTY’S PROPOSAL FOR COMBATTING 
WEALTH INEQUALITY 
 
Taxes have been an effective way to at least slow down the 
inegalitarian concentration of enormous wealth to levels 
comparable to those prior to the world wars and Great 
Depression. But these taxes are an imperfect means to 
continue to arrest divergence, especially given that taxes 
are not popular with many citizens and they were originally 
instituted during a time of emergency: world wars. In the 
US we have seen the top federal income tax rate drop from 
a high of 90 percent to the current rate of 39.6 percent, and 
we have likewise witnessed the capital gains top tax rate 
move from a high of 39.8 percent in 1978 to the current 20 
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percent. And one might wonder why it is a consistent 
theme within the US tax code that the taxes on capital gains 
are lower than taxes on labor income. It is possible for a 
very wealthy person with income mainly from capital gains 
to pay a federal tax rate of about 20 percent or slightly 
higher while someone who is doing well (but a far cry from 
wealthy) may be paying a federal tax rate closer to 39.6 on 
his or her labor income. 
 
Why should the focus of taxation be income—and in 
particular income from labor? Why not work toward 
creating institutions in which capital (all world capital 
ideally) can be mapped and followed? A cadastral survey 
of this kind would allow for more “effective regulation of 
the financial and banking system in order to avoid crisis” 
(518). A survey like this would also allow for more 
informed democratic debate regarding the appropriateness 
of capital allocations and inequalities (519). So not only 
would a tax on capital impede the growth of large fortunes, 
it would also allow greater transparency fostering informed 
democratic debate and more informed interventions by 
(say) the International Monetary Fund when faced with a 
potentially destabilizing financial crisis. 
 
Ideally there would be at least a small capital tax 
worldwide, but this would of course require an agreement 
of all countries as well as a consistent and effective 
regulatory agency. But a tax on capital can be used by 
individual countries or the EU to achieve the goals 
mentioned above as well as to thwart the growth of wealth 
inequalities. How might we include a tax on capital in our 
taxation system? 
 
A…solution is to compute the tax due on the 
basis of wealth rather than income. One can 
then assume a yield (of, say, 5 percent a 
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year) to estimate the income on capital and 
include that amount in the income subject to 
a progressive income tax.…Another solution 
is to apply a progressive tax directly to an 
individual’s total wealth. (526) 
 
With the presence of the tax on capital, the very wealthy 
would find it more difficult to avoid taxes on large portions 
of their capital stock. For example, at this time in the US, a 
very wealthy person will pay only 20 percent in taxes on 
dividend income. And the extremely wealthy are in a 
position to only take out a small portion of the annual 
growth of their capital for living expenses, leaving the bulk 
of it to grow at r or (if managed well) better. The tax on 
capital would also improve our ability to inform democratic 
debate and institutions like the IMF, and it would allow us 
to tax larger proportions of the capital possessed by the 
very wealthy progressively. 
 
7. GRIST FOR THE POLITICAL PHILOSOPHER’S 
MILL 
 
One of the main areas in political philosophy is distributive 
justice. How, from the moral point of view, should society’s 
goods be allocated? Two prominent views in the US are 
libertarianism and (some version of) economic 
egalitarianism. Since Piketty refers to John Rawls’ 
difference principle, we will consider Rawls’ conception of 
justice as our alternative to economic libertarianism. Our 
focus for our egalitarian arguments and positions will be 
collected from Rawls’ A Theory of Justice (hereafter TJ) and 
Justice as Fairness: A Restatement (hereafter JF). Arguably 
most of us are somewhere between these two views in our 
intuitions and argument arsenal prior to substantive inquiry 
and reflection. Many of us remain somewhere between the 
two after substantive inquiry and reflection. In this section 
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we will apply much of what was considered in the prior 
sections to the area of distributive justice. 
 
Libertarianism is the view in political philosophy that 
maintains that the role of the state should be confined to 
providing protection from foreign enemies by supplying 
military protection, providing protection from violations of 
the rights to life, liberty, and property by supplying police 
protection, and supplying civil courts for resolving 
violations of rights that are not essentially the state’s direct 
concern by allowing entities to sue for damages. Providing 
essentially these governmental functions allowed for the 
consumption of about 10 percent of a country’s income in 
taxes—unlike the third or half consumed today in taxes. 
Our focus for libertarian arguments and positions will be 
garnered from Robert Nozick’s book Anarchy, State, and 
Utopia (hereafter ASU). 
 
Very briefly, the attempt to justify libertarianism typically 
consists of using our intuitions regarding voluntary 
transactions as well as a “forced-labor” argument. 
Regarding the former, it makes sense to many of us that if a 
person used her labor income (or her income in general) to 
buy something or to invest the money, the object purchased 
or investment made belongs to her. She should be left alone 
to decide what to do with her purchase, and she should be 
able to reap the benefits (or suffer the losses) of her 
investment without interference. Regarding the forced-
labor argument, if the person discussed above must give 
(say) 10 percent of her income (from labor or capital) to 
provide services or goods for others (e.g., education, food 
stamps, and so on), then those people who receive the 
goods or services are “part owners” of her since she was 
forced by the government to provide help to others without 
her consent: 
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Seizing the results of someone’s labor is 
equivalent to seizing hours from him…. If 
people force you to do certain work, or 
unrewarded work, for a certain period of 
time, they decide what you are to do and 
what purposes your work is to serve apart 
from your decisions. This process whereby 
they take this decision from you makes them 
a part-owner of you; it gives them a 
property right in you. (ASU, 172) 
 
It is as if she worked for her pay (or took the risks involved 
in investing), and then she was forced to give up some of 
what rightly belongs to her to help others she may not even 
know and may not want to help. 
 
There is, I think, a natural plausibility to the moral 
justifications that are frequently used to defend a libertarian 
approach to distributive justice. If we want to know who 
should get what, we need look no further than to the history 
of the capital allocations. So long as the history does not 
include theft, fraud, coercion, and so on, then the capital 
allocations belong to whoever has them now—and it would 
be wrong, a kind of theft, to take some of it from those who 
own it to redistribute to others, regardless of the nobility of 
the intentions. 
 
But if we consider distributive justice more carefully—and 
Piketty’s data have provided a lot of information to 
consider, we see that what appears to be justice at one time 
does not appear to necessarily provide us with justice at 
another time. In ASU Nozick says, “As correct rules of 
inference are truth-preserving…so the means of transition 
from situation to another [absent force or fraud] are justice 
preserving” (151). But is justice preserved? Bill Gates has 
decided to leave his fortune to charity, for the most part. He 
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has no intention of leaving his fortune to his children. (But 
something tells me that his children will do okay with the 
millions rather than billions.) But let us say that a fortune 
like Gates’ is bequeathed to children, which is often the 
case with the extremely wealthy. What did the kid do to 
deserve, say, $20 billion? And then let’s say that, in income 
from capital and not labor, that amount increases in real 
dollars four times that amount and Gates’ grandkids inherit 
$40 billion in today’s dollars? According to libertarians like 
Nozick (in ASU), there is nothing wrong with this state of 
affairs: it is perfectly just so long as no laws were violated, 
et cetera. But can we sincerely believe that allocations of 
capital like those prior to the two world wars (in which 90 
percent of capital was owned by the top 10 percent) can 
possibly be considered just? Can it be just for capital alone 
to be able to magnify its growth and consume nearly all 
available capital? The justifications for libertarianism in the 
economic realm are indeed simple and perhaps 
immediately plausible, but on further reflection, especially 
with good data regarding what happens when capital is 
unleashed, the simple appears simplistic. 
 
Economic egalitarianism is the view in political philosophy 
that maintains that the role of the state should include 
mechanisms for providing substantially equal access to 
similar allocations of income and wealth, or that the state 
should be a force for reasonable convergence regarding 
these allocations. The work of John Rawls, most notably in 
his book TJ, has produced some of the strongest arguments 
for economic egalitarianism in the last century. According 
to Rawls, if we were to argue for principles of economic 
justice from a fair starting point, a starting point in which 
the parties to the discussion somehow lost specific 
information about themselves—their race, class, religion, 
and so on, the parties would select principles of justice that 
both mandated fair equality of opportunity and also focused 
Review: Capital in the Twenty-First Century | Jackson 
 
210 
 
on the long-term betterment of the worst-off class. If you 
lost the ability to know whether you are wealthy, middle 
class, or poor, you would protect yourself (just in case you 
are poor) and select a principle of justice regulating 
economic arrangements that would ultimately work for 
your betterment. The worst thing that can happen to you in 
this regard, once you find out who you are in society, is that 
you are poor. Wouldn’t it be nice to have the entire 
economic system working in your favor? 
 
Is this level of economic regulation feasible? Rawls was 
working up his arguments in the mid-twentieth century, 
publishing TJ in 1972. This was a time in the US in which 
tax rates were high and there was a War on Poverty. The 
federal minimum wage under Nixon was higher (indexed 
for inflation) than it is today under Obama. However, 
Rawls’ arguments in his major work appeared just as the 
effects of the War on Poverty were being questioned, and 
the high tax rates on income were likewise being 
questioned. The simple slogans from a more simplistic 
conception of distributive justice proved a more effective 
persuasive mechanism than the subtle arguments of the 
egalitarians. “Tax-and-spend liberals.” “Free to choose.” 
“Get government off our backs.” “Welfare state.” “Welfare 
moms.” While Piketty mentions Rawls and his difference 
principle in his book—and he appears to support something 
like it, theoretically, he does not explain it much or focus 
on whether it would be a good idea to implement it. Let’s 
see why this might be the case. 
 
According to the difference principle, any economic 
inequality is to be permitted only if this inequality is “to the 
greatest benefit of the least advantaged [members of the 
society]” (TJ, 83). The entire focus of the economy is the 
long-term betterment of those who are least advantaged. A 
principle as radical as this is tough enough to sell to an 
Essays in Philosophy 17(1) 
 
211 
 
audience consisting of philosophers interested in distrib-
utive justice, let alone typical citizens. What may have 
appeared to be a movement in the 1960s and early 1970s 
toward further economic egalitarianism did not have 
anything like the momentum required to provide more than 
what has been called a “safety net” for the poor. Rather 
than focusing on the poor, many egalitarians today (but 
certainly not all) simply want to improve the lives of the 
poor in proportion to improvements in the economy 
overall. Rawls attempted to provide the “justification” for 
high taxes that Piketty believes is lacking. The arguments 
were not lacking; they were rejected—or ignored. 
 
The concern now (or it is at least Piketty’s concern and I 
tend to share it) is to salvage what we can from the forces 
of convergence that led to a patrimonial middle class. This 
is arguably the best means today to promote the interests of 
the worst-off class as well, for it is easier to move from 
poverty to the middle class than from abject poverty to the 
upper 10 percent. 
 
As I write this, Donald Trump is stumbling and bumbling 
his way to the top of the Republican polls. He is rich. Some 
Republican candidates have quit the campaign, not 
necessarily for lack of ideas, but lack of donors. Mitt 
Romney was rich. To run for high office or to affect those 
who run for high office requires a kind of clout—not 
rhetoric, not character, not the possession of good ideas. 
Money. A further worry of the concentration of wealth is 
the creation of (or perhaps the victory of) oligarchy. This is 
an additional reason to question the moral standing of 
libertarian principles of economic justice that would permit 
extreme concentrations of wealth to exist. Rawls elucidates 
the problem as follows: 
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While it may appear…that citizens’ basic 
rights and liberties are effectively equal—all 
have the right to vote, to run for political 
office and to engage in party politics, and so 
on—social and economic inequalities in the 
background institutions are ordinarily so 
large that those with greater wealth and 
position usually control political life and 
enact legislation and social policies that 
advance their interests. (JF, 148) 
 
This was true in 2001, when JF was published. It is truer 
today. And tomorrow? Piketty’s work does not only 
provide us with content for a distributive-justice lament. 
Democracy may also at stake. 
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